Section 187: Removal of judges from office
Constitution of Zimbabwe
(1) A judge may be removed from office only for—
(a) inability to perform the functions of his or her office, due to mental or physical
incapacity;
(b) gross incompetence; or
(c) gross misconduct; and a judge cannot be removed from office except in accordance with this section.
(2) If the President considers that the question of removing the Chief Justice from office ought to be investigated, the President must appoint a tribunal to inquire into the matter.
(3) If the Judicial Service Commission advises the President that the question of removing any judge, including the Chief Justice, from office ought to be investigated, the President must appoint a tribunal to inquire into the matter.
(4) A tribunal appointed under this section must consist of at least three members appointed by the President, of whom–
(a) at least one must be a person who—
(i) has served as a judge of the Supreme Court or High Court in Zimbabwe; or
(ii) holds or has held office as a judge of a court with unlimited jurisdiction in civil
or criminal matters in a country whose common law is Roman-Dutch or
English, and English is an officially recognised language;
(b) at least one must be chosen from a list of three or more legal practitioners of seven
years’ standing or more who have been nominated by the association, constituted
under an Act of Parliament, which represents legal practitioners in Zimbabwe.
(5) The association referred to in subsection (4) (b) must prepare the list referred to in that subsection when so required by the President.
(6) The President must designate one of the members of a tribunal appointed under this section to be chairperson of the tribunal.
(7) A tribunal appointed under subsection (2) or (3) must inquire into the question of removing the judge concerned from office and, having done so, must report its findings to the President and recommend whether or not the judge should be removed from office.
(8) The President must act in accordance with the tribunal’s recommendation in terms of subsection (7).
(9) A tribunal appointed under this section has the same rights and powers as commissioners under the Commissions of Inquiry Act [Chapter 10:07], or any law that replaces that Act.
(10) If the question of removing a judge from office has been referred to a tribunal under this section, the judge is suspended from office until the President, on the recommendation of the tribunal, revokes the suspension or removes the judge from office.
(11) An Act of Parliament may empower the Judicial Service Commission or a tribunal appointed under this section to require any judge to submit to a medical examination by a medical board established for that purpose, in order to ascertain his or her physical or mental health.
Key Insight: Judicial Independence and Accountability
This section establishes a careful balance between judicial independence and accountability. By requiring a formal tribunal process with specific qualifications for tribunal members, the constitution creates a protective buffer against arbitrary removal of judges. The mandatory adherence to tribunal recommendations by the President (section 8) is particularly significant as it prevents executive overreach. This process helps maintain separation of powers while still providing a mechanism to address serious judicial misconduct or incapacity.